05/09/2026
[LONG READ] THE COUP THAT ALMOST WAS — AND THE EVIDENCE THAT MUST FOLLOW.
There is a particular difference between a coup that failed and a coup that merely exists in an official statement.
Those who were old enough to understand what happened in Zambia in 1997 will probably remember the atmosphere.
Captain Solo and his fellow conspirators did not simply announce themselves on television and disappear into the pages of history. The country could feel that something extraordinary had happened.
Army tanks were seen around ZNBC. Soldiers were involved. Gunfire was part of the story. Lives were lost. The machinery of the state was visibly shaken.
It was a coup attempt — and it failed.
And that last part matters.
Because in matters of coups, “almost” does not count. A coup either succeeds or it fails. But before we arrive at that conclusion, there must first be enough evidence to establish that there was, in fact, a serious attempt to overthrow the constitutional order.
That is where today's conversation becomes interesting.
We are now hearing about a militia allegedly being assembled, trained and equipped for the purpose of overthrowing government. We are hearing of soldiers and civilians allegedly connected to such a plot.
If these allegations are true, they are extremely serious.
But serious allegations require serious evidence.
SHOW US THE COUP
This is not a request for sensationalism.
It is a request for accountability.
If a militia was being prepared to overthrow government, how many people were involved?
Who were they?
How were they trained?
Where were they trained?
What weapons were recovered?
How many military weapons were allegedly seized?
Where are the weapons?
What military equipment was found?
What was the chain of command?
What was the alleged plan?
Which military personnel were involved?
And, most importantly, how close was this alleged operation to actually threatening the State?
Because there is a fundamental difference between a group of angry, overzealous individuals talking recklessly about violence against government or against the ruling party and an organised military operation capable of actually attempting it.
The public deserves to understand that difference.
HISTORY GIVES US A STANDARD
The 1997 attempted coup provides an uncomfortable but useful historical comparison.
Those who witnessed it did not need an elaborate PowerPoint or create video presentation to understand that something was happening.
There were soldiers.
There were military movements.
There were weapons.
There were tanks.
There was gunfire.
There were casualties.
There was an unmistakable smell of military activity around institutions of the State.
In other words, the evidence had a physical presence.
Nobody had to be told that tanks were tanks.
Nobody needed a government spokesperson to convince them that soldiers were occupying strategic locations.
The events were visible.
And that is why the historical memory of 1997 remains so powerful.
BUT TODAY'S ALLEGATIONS ARE DIFFERENT
This does not mean today's alleged militia should be dismissed simply because the public has not seen tanks rolling down the streets.
Modern coups do not necessarily have to look like 1997.
A contemporary attempt to destabilise a government could involve clandestine networks, financing, intelligence operations, cyber activity, recruitment, weapons procurement or infiltration of security structures.
So absence of tanks does not automatically mean absence of a coup plot.
But the reverse is equally important:
The absence of visible evidence cannot simply be replaced by the seriousness of the allegation.
The more extraordinary the claim, the greater the public interest in seeing credible evidence.
And this is particularly important when the allegations involve political opponents, soldiers, former security personnel or prominent citizens.
Because once the word “coup” enters the political vocabulary, it can become extraordinarily powerful.
It can justify arrests.
It can influence public opinion.
It can create fear.
It can damage reputations.
It can be used to portray political opposition as a national-security threat.
That is precisely why the State must be exceptionally careful.
FOUR SOLDIERS AND TEN CIVILIANS?
There is another question that deserves serious consideration.
If the alleged conspiracy involved only a relatively small number of soldiers and civilians, how realistically could such a group have seized control of a country as large and complex as Zambia?
A successful coup requires more than courage, anger and a few weapons.
It requires organisation, communications, logistics, strategic positions, manpower and control of key institutions.
You would need to neutralise or win over significant elements of the security forces.
You would need communications.
You would need access to strategic infrastructure.
You would need political and military coordination.
You would need the capacity to maintain control after the initial action.
And a truly organized militia would never go to the media and mention anything close or related to their plans... We all know that this a serious matter that amounts to treason in this case.
So if the alleged plot was genuinely designed to overthrow the government, the public is entitled to understand how the architects believed it could actually work.
Otherwise, we risk confusing a conspiracy with a coup.
And those are not necessarily the same thing.
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT FEAR ITS OWN EVIDENCE
If the State has compelling evidence, it should have confidence in it.
Publish the names where legally permissible.
Explain the allegations.
Show the recovered military equipment where doing so will not compromise ongoing investigations.
Tell the public what was allegedly being planned.
Let investigators present their evidence in court.
Let the courts determine guilt.
That is how a constitutional democracy should respond to a threat.
Not through rumours.
Not through whispers.
Not through political insinuations.
And certainly not through asking citizens to believe something simply because the State says it happened.
There is nothing anti-government about demanding evidence.
In fact, evidence protects government.
It protects the innocent from being labelled criminals.
It protects the guilty from hiding behind political arguments.
And it protects the State from accusations that it manufactured a security threat for political convenience.
BECAUSE “ALMOST” IS NOT ENOUGH
Perhaps the most important lesson from 1997 is this:
A failed coup is still a coup attempt.
But an alleged coup is not automatically a coup attempt merely because it has been described as one.
The distinction matters.
Zambians should be able to ask difficult questions without being accused of supporting an overthrow of government.
We should be able to say:
Prove it.
Show us the weapons.
Show us the evidence.
Explain the organisation.
Explain the alleged plan.
Tell us how close it supposedly came to ex*****on.
And if the evidence is overwhelming, prosecute those responsible to the full extent of the law.
But if the evidence is weak, contradictory or incapable of establishing an actual attempt to overthrow constitutional government, then the public deserves to know that too.
Because democracy cannot survive on coups that exist only in headlines.
And neither can national security.
In 1997, Zambia saw the tanks.
Today, if we are being told that another attempt to seize power was stopped before it reached that stage, then perhaps the most reasonable question is also the simplest:
WHAT EXACTLY WAS STOPPED — AND WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE?
Credit: Moth Media
