03/14/2026
On this Saturday evening, I find myself needing to directly address public concern regarding one of the Bracken County Sheriff’s Office policies related to our response to welfare checks.
Our policy changes are not the result of being uncaring, unconcerned, or lacking a moral commitment to help members of our community in crisis. To the contrary, these decisions are driven by binding case law and legal precedent that governs when and how law enforcement may lawfully intervene in medical and mental‑health emergencies.
Courts across the country have made clear that applying traditional law‑enforcement standards to medical or mental‑health emergencies places officers in an untenable legal position. As one federal court aptly explained, applying the Graham v. Connor use‑of‑force framework to a medical emergency “is equivalent to a baseball player entering the batter’s box with two strikes already against him.”
For most of American history, law enforcement has been treated as the default emergency responder for all of society’s ills—not because the Constitution requires it, but because no immediate alternative exist. Law enforcement fills the gap out of necessity, not by design. Modern constitutional law makes clear that using law enforcement as the default response is on legally unstable footing when the issue is a welfare check or mental illness, rather than crime.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Constitution does not impose an affirmative duty on law enforcement to protect individuals from harm. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County, the Court held that the Due Process Clause is a limitation on state power, not a guarantee of safety. Even where the state knows a person is in danger and has the capacity to intervene, it has no constitutional obligation to do so unless it has taken the person into custody or otherwise restrained their liberty. The Constitution restrains government action; it does not mandate it.
That principle was reaffirmed in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, where the Court ruled that even mandatory‑sounding statutes do not create an enforceable right to law‑enforcement protection. Law‑enforcement discretion remains intact, and individuals do not possess a constitutional entitlement to law‑enforcement action—even in life‑or‑death situations. Law enforcement may act, but it is not constitutionally required to do so.
Together, these cases establish a crucial baseline: law enforcement is not constitutionally required to respond to welfare checks or mental‑health crises at all. The legal problem arises when law enforcement does respond.
When officers arrive at a mental‑health or welfare call, they are not entering a criminal investigation. There is often no probable cause, no suspect, and no allegation of a crime. Yet the moment law enforcement arrives, the interaction becomes governed by the Fourth Amendment—because law enforcement officers are agents of the state with the unique authority to detain, restrain, and use force. Every command, physical contact, or restraint by law enforcement is legally treated as a seizure.
This is where the constitutional structure sharply diverges from medical response. Emergency medical services and clinicians operate under an entirely different legal framework. EMS authority flows from medical consent, emergency necessity, and health statutes—not from criminal law. When paramedics restrain a patient, courts analyze the act as a medical intervention, justified by treatment needs and governed by clinical standards. It is not treated as a Fourth Amendment seizure in the same way, because EMS does not wield arrest authority or criminal‑enforcement power.
Law enforcement, by contrast, cannot step outside the Fourth Amendment simply because the situation is medical. When law enforcement restrains someone—even for benevolent reasons—the law treats that restraint as coercive state action. The Constitution does not recognize “medical intent” as a substitute for constitutional justification when the actor is law enforcement.
Courts in the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky) have repeatedly warned that mental‑health welfare checks easily turn into unconstitutional seizures precisely because of this mismatch. In Rudolph v. Babinec, the Sixth Circuit held that officers conducting a welfare check lacked qualified immunity when the encounter escalated into a forced mental‑health seizure without specific knowledge that the individual posed an immediate danger to themselves or others. Good intentions, concern, or subjective fear were not enough for the court.
The court emphasized that a mental‑health crisis is not a crime, and that law‑enforcement authority is therefore narrower, not broader, in such situations. Unlike EMS, law enforcement cannot rely on generalized notions of “help” or “safety” to justify physical control. Absent probable cause of imminent danger, law‑enforcement restraint becomes constitutionally suspect.
The Ninth Circuit has gone even further, repeatedly holding that when officers confront individuals in mental‑health crises, the government’s interest in using force is diminished when the threat is primarily to the individual themselves, not to others. In cases such as Deorle v. Rutherford, Drummond v. City of Anaheim, and Scott v. Smith, the court denied qualified immunity where officers used force against mentally ill individuals who were not suspected of crimes and did not present immediate threats to others.
Across these cases, courts consistently stress that time, distance and communication, are constitutionally required. Law‑enforcement action—especially physical restraint—often creates the very danger officers claim to be preventing. This is not merely a tactical failure; it is a constitutional one. The presence of armed authority, commands backed by force, and the possibility of arrest fundamentally alters the encounter in ways that medical responders do not. Courts repeatedly recognize that mental‑health symptoms—paranoia, hallucinations, and trauma responses—are often aggravated by law‑enforcement presence, increasing resistance and escalating encounters that might otherwise remain medical.
This leads to the constitutional paradox at the heart of law‑enforcement‑led welfare checks: law enforcement has no duty to intervene, but once it does, it assumes significant constitutional risk.
The Kentucky Association of Counties (KACo-our Insurer), in its role as a risk‑management, insurance, and liability‑guidance organization for Kentucky counties, has consistently advised that welfare checks—particularly those involving medical or mental‑health concerns—present high constitutional and civil‑liability risk for law enforcement. KACo guidance emphasizes that law enforcement has no affirmative constitutional duty to respond to welfare checks, and that when officers intervene in non‑criminal medical or mental‑health situations, their authority is narrow and their exposure to Fourth Amendment liability is significant. Consistent with Kentucky law under KRS Chapter 202A, KACo encourages diversion, the use of Crisis Intervention Teams, and clinician‑ or EMS‑led responses whenever possible, with law enforcement serving a limited, supportive role when a clear legal basis exists. These recommendations are not based on indifference, but on established case law, risk‑reduction principles, and the responsibility to protect both individuals in crisis and Kentucky counties from predictable constitutional violations and financial liability.
The law is quietly and clearly moving away from law‑enforcement‑led welfare checks—not because law enforcement is negligent or uncaring, but because constitutional structure makes it the wrong tool. Law enforcement is designed to enforce the law; EMS is designed to treat illness. The job of Sheriff is to ensure the physical and financial security of the community as a whole by limiting your exposure to actual harm and monetary liability.
Respectfully,
Sheriff Robert A. Boody III
