Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

09/12/2026

The US Can't Build Ships, So We're Building a Shipyard for the AI Age
https://finance.biggo.com/news/9073d8a0d401357b

"If you understand history and what has dictated naval power, it's really just the ability to build ships. Oh ..., we can't build ships. We need naval power. What can we build? And it turns out we can build a lot of boats."

Putting aside any argument as to what is the definition of boats (though I do like Nova Scotia Boatbuilders Association's 'of 80 feet or less', that length fitting European locks, a length reflected in Transport Canada regulations), this article puts it well. Naval power (sea power) is an amalgam ('eco-system' to use a currently favored term) that includes investment, infrastructure, workers, design capability and supply sources. If naval power can't be achieved/retained the old fashioned way, then that way needs a hard look and something innovative needs to be done.

Of course, history will also tell you to be careful in the introduction of innovation. Torpedo rams, anyone? (https://cimsec.org/ram-19th-century-naval-warfare-dead-end/)

Saronic CEO Dino Mavrookas argues that the collapse of American shipbuilding — from 0.1% of global capacity to a workforce hollowed out by policy…

09/12/2026

The Overstretch Facing the US Navy
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/overstretch-facing-us-navy

"While it might be intuitive to think of the problem (of longer readiness cycles) in terms of force structure and posture, it is also arguably reflective of a deeper issue of strategic discipline. The risk posed to readiness by the strategy of persistent presence has been understood for at least a decade."

Whilst the focus of the article is the USN, the problem of longer readiness cycles/deployments can be one that plagues all services in the absence of strategic discipline. (For there to be strategic discipline, strategies need frequent review and constant socialization across services, government and society.)

The Canadian Indo-Pacific Strategy states "Today, that includes sustained and persistent deployments of Canadian Armed Forces planes and frigates that monitor activities that are in violation of UN sanctions, and which are aimed to deter nuclear proliferation." That "sustained and persistent deployments" (three frigate deployments annually?) is not to the same extent as that of the US. That Strategy (policy, really) assumes sufficient readiness. But it does provide policy objectives ("...conduct forward naval presence operations, uphold international law of the sea including the UN convention, and conduct collaborative deployments with its allies and partners") albeit loosely phrased.

The US is exceeding its own plans for deployment of aircraft carriers, and the knock-on effects, and the strain, should be a cause for concern.

08/30/2026

Marine Corps Lab Accepts Surface Craft Prototype
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/25/marine-corps-lab-accepts-surface-craft-prototype

"Ancillary Surface Craft are designed to provide transportation of personnel and supplies to shallow-gradient, unimproved and unsurveyed shorelines."

New term to some of us old salts, "Ancillary Surface Craft", especially 'ancillary' in lieu of 'auxiliary'. Not a type of vessel in the NATO standard. Its use could have written this off as incorrect reporting or a project title, but there is "ASC 1" painted on the vessel's bow (of course, that could be taken as Auxiliary Surface Craft). It is a US Marine Corps vessel so the expectation would have been that Marines would use the NATO standard as followed by the US Navy (not that the USN follows it closely, viz LCS Littoral Combat Ship, another type not in the standard). Might there be an Australian influence?

Ancillary (= providing necessary extra help, support, or supplies to a main system, organization, or activity) is actually an appropriate term: "The ASC is intended to complement the larger Medium Landing Ship. The ASC is sized and configured with a very shallow draft to deliver logistical support to landing sites beyond the reach of larger vessels, according to the release. Taken together, the LSM and ASC give a Stand-in Force a route from an intermediate staging base to the beach without dependence on ports, piers or causeways."

So, ais this the beginning of development of a new term/concept in ship typing? Certainly the old typing is getting increasingly lacking, what with growth in ship sizes and capabilities, and with drones entering operational service.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory recently accepted the first of two Ancillary Surface Craft prototypes, according to a news release published last week. Ancillary Surface Craft are designed to provide transportation of personnel and supplies to shallow-gradient, unimproved and unsurveyed shor...

08/28/2026

How Quickly Can the DOD Rebuild and Recast the Mu*****ns Industrial Base?
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-quickly-can-dod-rebuild-and-recast-mu*****ns-industrial-base

"The wars in Iran and Ukraine have shown how the growing importance of air and missile defense, the accelerating pace of combat, and the risk of simultaneous, protracted conflicts across multiple regions can each strain the mu*****ns industrial base."

A US-focused article, and certainly the 'keys' it lists are US, but there are thoughts for those involved in the Canadian mu*****ns industrial base to consider.

Further:
There’s no shortcut to replenish US mu*****ns stockpiles
https://www.defenseone.com/business/2026/08/theres-no-shortcut-replenish-us-mu*****ns-stockpiles/415558/
and (for something Canadian):
New Brunswick site picked for new Canadian explosives factory as NATO demand grows
(Editor: Meta deletes posts such as this with a link to CBC as a news site so the URL has been removed.)

08/28/2026

How Quickly Can the DOD Rebuild and Recast the Mu*****ns Industrial Base?
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-quickly-can-dod-rebuild-and-recast-mu*****ns-industrial-base

"The wars in Iran and Ukraine have shown how the growing importance of air and missile defense, the accelerating pace of combat, and the risk of simultaneous, protracted conflicts across multiple regions can each strain the mu*****ns industrial base."

A US-focused article, and certainly the 'keys' it lists are US, but there are thoughts for those involved in the Canadian mu*****ns industrial base to consider.

Further:
There’s no shortcut to replenish US mu*****ns stockpiles
https://www.defenseone.com/business/2026/08/theres-no-shortcut-replenish-us-mu*****ns-stockpiles/415558/
and (for something Canadian):
New Brunswick site picked for new Canadian explosives factory as NATO demand grows
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-nalagx-new-brunswick-explosives-factory-nato-mu*****ns-ukraine/

08/23/2026

Inside Brazil’s 3D-Printed Gun Supply Chain
(Editor: Meta deletes posts such as this with a link to warontherocks as a news site so the URL has been removed.)

It's very probably already happening that criminals are printing metal gun parts to manufacture illegal guns. Challenges for law enforcement and the advanced manufacturing industry.

08/23/2026

Inside Brazil’s 3D-Printed Gun Supply Chain
https://warontherocks.com/inside-brazils-3d-printed-gun-supply-chain/

It's very pribably already happening that criminals are printing metal gun parts to manufacture illegal guns. Challenges for law enforcement and the advanced manufacturing industry.

On June 26, 2026, the Civil Police of Rio de Janeiro, through its specialized fi****ms, am******on, and explosives unit, raided a clandestine workshop in

08/23/2026

What Canada’s shipbuilding strategy is getting right, and where it is still failing
https://opencanada.org/what-canadas-shipbuilding-strategy-is-getting-right-and-where-it-is-still-failing/

"The shipbuilding lesson three quarters of a century after the St. Laurent class is the same one: the most capable warship in the world means little if the country waits a generation to receive it. The strategic frame around build-at-home, continuous build, shipyard rationalization, and modularity is mostly correct. The cultural problem is the impulse to ask one ship to do everything and to ask new ships to be paper designs first and water designs second. Until addressed, the impulse will leave the Royal Canadian Navy without the warships it needs."

The most capable warship in the world means nothing if Canada waits a generation to receive it.

08/03/2026

Study looks at options to upgrade the Hudson Bay Railway to unlock northern economic opportunities
https://www.railwaygazette.com/canada/2026/08/03/study-looks-at-options-to-upgrade-the-hudson-bay-railway-to-unlock-northern-economic-opportunities/

Good move by the Arctic Gateway Group to get a study done of the railway up to Churchill. Maybe the Department of National Defence should be asked to establish a railway-focused Reserve element somewhere along the line. Such units don't exist in Canada, they would have to be envisioned/created, probably modelled on one of our major allies. It could be an alternative or complement to having a port defence/security Reserve element established in Churchill itself.

CANADA: Systra has been commissioned to undertake a study of potential enhancements to the Hudson Bay Railway to support plans to develop the remote northern line as a strategic national transport corridor and make the port of Churchill a key export gateway. The study has been commissioned by the Ar...

08/03/2026

Netherlands moves ahead with sonar-equipped ASW USV for future frigates
https://www.navylookout.com/netherlands-moves-ahead-with-sonar-equipped-asw-usv-for-future-frigates/

"A compact active dipping sonar, based on Thales’ FLASH family, will be the primary sensor installed on the 12-metre USV..."

Interesting that a dipping sonar is to be deployed from the USV. One normally expects USV to be integrated with towed arrays.

One can wonder what sort of callsigns for warships' USV might be in/come into use, parallel to ship helicopter nicknames like 'Avalanche' and 'Stalker.'

The Royal Netherlands Navy is moving ahead with plans to equip each of its future Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates with a 12-metre uncrewed surface vessel designed to extend the ship’s underwater detection reach. The Dutch Naval Design (DND) has been authorised to begin design work on the vessel wh...