27/05/2026
The Revolutionary Council on the Ethics of the Armed Struggle
On 27 May 1980, the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) received a document adopted by the meeting of the Revolutionary Council (RC) on 22 May 1980 titled “Our Military Perspectives and Some Special Problems”. The document related to the fate met in January 1980 by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) units infiltrated to South Africa from Swaziland, which highlighted the ongoing problem of the long-term sustainability of MK units within the country.
During the discussions, the Silverton siege got into the spotlight. The document analysed the severe operational failures of MK units that had infiltrated from Swaziland in January 1980, identifying fatal vulnerabilities in their deployment, infiltration tactics, and underground networking. It became a concern for the Revolutionary Council, how MK units sent across the Swaziland border were so easily intercepted and neutralised by South African security forces in January 1980. This tragic outcome directly preceded the Silverton siege in Pretoria, where three MK operatives (Stephen Mafoko, Humphrey Makhubo, and Wilfred Madela) on their way to carry out a mission were cornered by police, leading to a fatal bank hostage standoff.
The document therefore served as a candid evaluation of MK’s tactical limits. It prompted the ANC leadership to realise that armed insurgents could not successfully operate without a robust, pre-established political infrastructure and underground support base within South Africa. Primarily, the document noted that the RC’s immediate reaction to the incident was “one of uncertainty about the wisdom of this type of tactic. Individual reactions in our movement were generally negative and at least one public comment expressed condemnation of this action”.
A complication arose, however, because the siege quickly became perhaps one of the most successful operations in MK history, when it was judged by the objectives set for the armed propaganda campaign. Those interviewed in a survey conducted in Soweto described the Silverton Trio as heroes, and said they generally approved of the action. The document said that hostage taking was not supposed to be mechanically rejected, considering, for example, that cadres found themselves surrounded by security forces, as it happened at Silverton.
Despite the ethical breach, the strategic concept of “armed propaganda” – using military actions primarily to boost domestic morale, multiply political recruitment and project power – was highly successful. During the six-hour standoff, the cadres explicitly demanded the release of Nelson Mandela. This public demand on national television and radio gave massive momentum to the nascent, global “Free Mandela” campaign.
Moreover, bringing an armed confrontation into Silverton, Pretoria – the highly secured, administrative heart of the apartheid regime – shattered the state’s illusion of absolute control and invulnerability. To the oppressed Black majority, the absolute refusal of the trio to surrender to the heavily armed police force transformed them into martyrs. Their defiance sparked a profound surge in urban political resistance and MK enlistment across South African townships throughout the early 1980s.
This was the only incident in which MK cadres, in contravention of ANC policy, seized hostages for political ends. The Pretoria regime sent out disinformation to the effect that the ANC had issued a statement in Lusaka saying that MK is involved in a “campaign to kill and seize hostages”.
This was vigorously denied by the ANC, and interpreted as not only an attempt to smear the organisation but also to prepare the ground for attacks on ANC targets. However, this left the larger question of whether hostage taking was supposed to be undertaken with deliberate forethought in order to compel the enemy to respond to specific demands. Would that be legitimate propaganda?
The document was non-committal, saying indeed, at times, operations were derailed when cadres unexpectedly found themselves in situations for which there had been no planning whatsoever. The Silverton Bank siege, in which two civilian women and three MK cadres were killed, provided an example of this problem. This incident also illustrated the manner in which the regime’s refusal to admit that it was involved in a state of war, and to accord MK cadres prisoner-of-war status – usually insisting on opening fire instead of taking captives – resulted in many unnecessary casualties.
On 14 April 1980, nine MK members – all of whom had left the country in 1976 to join the ANC – appeared in the Pretoria Magistrate’s court in connection with the Silverton Bank Siege, alleged plans to attack the Port Natal Administration Board, and an attack on January 4 on Soekmekaar police station. They were charged with high treason, two counts of murder, and 21 of attempted murder, and all pleaded not guilty.
None of them was accused of being present at the Silverton siege but all nine were accused of murdering the two women, according to the “common purpose” doctrine. Benjamin Tau alone was also charged with conspiring with the dead cadres to carry out the bank siege, although he had been in custody at the time, and of surveying the premises beforehand.
Petrus Mashigo told the court that the attack on Soekmekaar police station had been intended as “armed propaganda” in protest against the forced removal of the community in the area. It was intended to show the ANC sympathised with the plight of the people. Mashigo testified that during his training cadres were told not to use methods involving the killing of civilians, and that the ANC opposed methods such as the taking of hostages.
Ikanyeng Molebatsi testified that they had decided against carrying out the attack on the Watloo tank farm because too many lives would be lost. Benjamin Tau admitted he had infiltrated the country on a mission to attack the Watloo installations but denied he had reconnoitred the bank for attack – police had forced him to point at the bank and then photographed him. He said he would refuse to attack a bank because he knew it was against ANC policy.
In its second submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the ANC reflected the views of the Revolutionary Council and the deductions that transpired when it deliberated on its report. In the submission the ANC averred that: “When unexpected difficulties arose, cadres had to think on their feet: and sometimes they made the wrong decisions. At times, given the refusal of the regime to treat MK members as prisoners of war, the situations they faced were desperate to the extent that it is highly unlikely that there would be a peaceful outcome, no matter what they decided – the Silverton bank siege and the Goch Street incident are cases in point.”
The Silverton Siege was one of the most dramatic and violent operations linked to MK that had ever taken place inside South Africa. ANC President, Oliver Tambo, was not actually comfortable about what had taken place, yet he continued praising the courage and sacrifice of the combatants. In fact, he was made aware that the cadres had been caught out and had to make an instant, desperate stand that would publicise their act.
According to Tambo, “For 20 years, we have resorted to prudent and selective violence. We have attacked material targets and not individuals. We wanted to be sure that nobody suffered the slightest scratch. In reply to that, our people were killed, imprisoned, and tortured, and it is becoming unreasonable to pay so dearly for our actions” (Callinicos).
The symbolism of actions by MK infused the masses with the confidence to take on Hippos and other embodiments of the state. The problem was that the creativity of the masses in this respect was deprived of arms and skills in the hands of MK. The requirements of urban guerrilla action kept many potentially excellent political cadres in MK isolated from the mass movement, rather than assisting in developing it.
Responding to this, Comrade Mzala argued that “It is our task now to give the utmost support to the people’s combat efforts; to organise that which is spontaneous; to explain to the broadest masses of the people the significance of a revolutionary army in the struggle for freedom; to train and arm various units among the people with our acquired politico-military skills. The idea of leaving the country to acquire training in friendly countries has never been to come back and fight on behalf of the people, so that they should look on us as their heroes and saviours. A vanguard movement organises the spontaneous actions of the masses, but cannot make a revolution for them with its own forces alone” (African Communist, No. 86, 1981).
Justifying the difficulties of achieving what Comrade Mzala was raising, Joe Slovo maintained that “Broadly speaking, we are still·in this phase of creating an organised army internally In both the urban and rural areas, and tackling not just mute targets but enemy personnel as well. Perhaps within that phase one can add that an additional sub-phase is in a process of being entered, that is to act in such a way that the impact of confrontation is felt not just in the black areas but also within the white electorate, the main constituency of support for the regime.”
Nevertheless, paying tribute to these three heroes, Wilfred Madela, Fanie Mafoko and Humphrey Makhubu, the official journal of Umkhonto (MK), “Dawn”, emphasised that the “The three youths of Isandlwana were forced by the prevailing conditions of an encirclement by the enemy and rather than surrender to the already sinking boat of apartheid, they decided to hold hostages and politicise their captives and tell them about what the African National Congress is fighting for.”
“Besides demanding the release of Comrade Mandela”, the tribute added, “the three patriots made other political demands which the Pretoria boers tried to suppress at all costs. Even the racist Commissioner of Police, General Mike Geldenhuys, was forced to admit that: ‘They are the South Africans who left the country in the vicinity of 1977 … in any case, I don’t want to say anything that will advertise the cause of the ANC’.”
The tribute continued to say, “Therefore, we of the African National Congress and its allies, pay tribute to the valiant immortal spirit of the three patriotic sons of the working-class of our country, for heroically taking part in the last battle for the destruction of the last bastion of imperialism in Africa, the Botha-Malan fascist boer regime.”
According to the tribute, “Their political conviction enabled them to accept death for the sake of life, hence they fought to their last cartridge. An age-old Russian saying goes thus: ‘The glory of heroes gives birth to new heroes’. Therefore, Makana, Shaka, Cetshwayo, Sekhukhuni, Maqed’indaba, Dingane, etc., gave birth to these Heroes of the Revolution. They are an inspiring source of courage and staunchness to the militant youth of our homeland who are presently defying oppression in all its camouflaged racist forms.”
“Our Battle Cry Is and Shall Continue to Be:
VICTORY OR DEATH! WE SHALL WIN!”
Sources:
Umkhonto we Sizwe, “Heroes of Our Revolution”, Dawn – Monthly Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1981.
Comrade Mzala, “Has the Time Come for the Arming of the Masses”, The African Communist, No. 86, Third Quarter, 1981.
Joe Slovo, “1976 to the Present”, Dawn – Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Souvenir Issue, 1986.
African National Congress, “Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, August 1996.
African National Congress, “Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, 12 May 1997.
Martin Legassick, “Armed Struggle and Democracy: The Case of South Africa”, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2002.
Luli Callinicos, “Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains”, David Philip, 2004.
Stephen Ellis, “External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960 – 1990”, Oxford University Press, 2013.
Thula Simpson, “Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle”, Penguin, 2016.
Castro Khwela
Good evening fellow Compatriots!🙏🏾✊🏾👊🏾
