07/01/2024
Immunity in good part for past President Donald Trump in a decision by the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) released today, July 1, 2024. It was the last case released and it is on a day not usually used to release decisions. But, this Court is set on radically changing our government, how it operates and what it does. We voted for people who appointed the justices and we got what we voted for. Expect more, probably radical, changes when Donald Trump becomes President again. (see the 2025 Heritage Progect Report https://www.project2025.org/ to see the broad changes coming soon.)
SCOTUS six, three appointed by Donald Trump plus Roberts, Alito and Thomas found immunity in good part for the President's actions while in office and a presumption of immunity for some actions, thereby protecting in good part Donald Trump's actions. The very long deliberation period on this case makes it virtually impossible for a trial on the January 6th "hostage taking" event to take place before the election. (Of course, Judge Cannon has slowed the document and subpoena trial down out of her totally being over her head as a federal judge or her strong support for Donald Trump and hope to go further up the food chain to join the six who helped Trump by delaying the decision on immunity and undercutting an excellent lower court decision) Three other justices argued that the Court had just undermined the Founding Fathers' understanding of law - that no person should be above the law.
Here is part of the decision for you to read and either rejoice or cry:
TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23–939. Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024
A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four
counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the
November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that
election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false
claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment
based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the
outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District
Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C.
Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.
Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature
of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity
from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no
immunity for unofficial acts. Pp. 5–43.
(a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history
of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Determining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution
may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential
power under the Constitution. The nature of that power requires that
a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for
official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the
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President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity
must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled
to at least presumptive immunity. Pp. 5–15.
(1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a
President of the United States of America.” §1, cl. 1. The President
has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591
U. S. 786, 800. His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638
(Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such authority, Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one
targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional
power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that
examines such Presidential actions. The Court thus concludes that
the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority. Pp. 6–9.
(2) Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive
and preclusive” authority. The reasons that justify the President’s absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of
his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas
where his authority is shared with Congress. To determine the President’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Framers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases
where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents. P.
9.
(i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigorous” and “energetic” Executive. The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They vested the President with “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750. Appreciating the “unique
risks” that arise when the President’s energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of
his official duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities
and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and supported by our history.” Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.
In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a former President is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts
within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Id., at 756.
The Court’s “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the President’s attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless
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worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular official decision.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19.
By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the President, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of absolute immunity. During the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall rejected President
Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to
a subpoena. Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the existence of a “privilege” to withhold certain “official paper[s].” United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va.). And when a
subpoena issued to President Richard Nixon, the Court rejected his
claim of “absolute privilege.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
703. But recognizing “the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” it held that a
“presumptive privilege” protects Presidential communications. Id., at
708. Because that privilege “relates to the effective discharge of a
President’s powers,” id., at 711, the Court deemed it “fundamental to
the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution.” Id., at 708. Pp. 9–12.
(ii) Criminally prosecuting a President for official conduct undoubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his
possession. The danger is greater than what led the Court to recognize
absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the
President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating action” required of an independent Executive. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at
745. Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal prosecutions than civil damages suits, the threat of trial, judgment, and
imprisonment is a far greater deterrent and plainly more likely to distort Presidential decisionmaking than the potential payment of civil
damages. The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly
and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions under “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. United States, 579
U. S. 550, 575, raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of government,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751. But there is also a compelling
“public interest in fair and effective law enforcement.” Vance, 591
U. S., at 808.
Taking into account these competing considerations, the Court concludes that the separation of powers principles explicated in the
Court’s precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from
criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter
of his official responsibility. Such an immunity is required to safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the Executive
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Branch, and to enable the President to carry out his constitutional duties without undue caution. At a minimum, the President must be
immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can
show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no
“dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754. Pp. 12–15.
(3) As for a President’s unofficial acts, there is no immunity. Although Presidential immunity is required for official actions to ensure
that the President’s decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of
future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern does not
support immunity for unofficial conduct. Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694,
and n. 19. The separation of powers does not bar a prosecution predicated on the President’s unofficial acts. P. 15.
(b) The first step in deciding whether a former President is entitled
to immunity from a particular prosecution is to distinguish his official
from unofficial actions. In this case, no court thus far has drawn that
distinction, in general or with respect to the conduct alleged in particular. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to be mindful that it is
“a court of final review and not first view.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566
U. S. 189, 201. Critical threshold issues in this case are how to differentiate between a President’s official and unofficial actions, and how
to do so with respect to the indictment’s extensive and detailed allegations covering a broad range of conduct. The Court offers guidance on
those issues. Pp. 16–32.
(1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and statutory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his
office. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action
is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s authority to take that action. But the breadth of the President’s “discretionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United
States frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innumerable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The
immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer perimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so
long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.”
Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC).
In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire
into the President’s motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would
risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unofficial
merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Otherwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that
an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect.
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Ibid. Pp. 17–19.
(2) With the above principles in mind, the Court turns to the conduct alleged in the indictment. Certain allegations—such as those involving Trump’s discussions with the Acting Attorney General—are
readily categorized in light of the nature of the President’s official relationship to the office held by that individual. Other allegations—
such as those involving Trump’s interactions with the Vice President,
state officials, and certain private parties, and his comments to the
general public—present more difficult questions. Pp. 19–30.
(i) The indictment alleges that as part of their conspiracy to
overturn the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election,
Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to leverage the Justice Department’s power and authority to convince certain States to replace
their legitimate electors with Trump’s fraudulent slates of electors.
According to the indictment, Trump met with the Acting Attorney
General and other senior Justice Department and White House officials to discuss investigating purported election fraud and sending a
letter from the Department to those States regarding such fraud. The
indictment further alleges that after the Acting Attorney General resisted Trump’s requests, Trump repeatedly threatened to replace him.
The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations
regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s use of official
power. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive
and preclusive” authority. The Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate
and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693. And the President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove
the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750.
The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were
shams or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President
of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. Because the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority, Trump is absolutely immune from prosecution for the
alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. Pp. 19–21.
(ii) The indictment next alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role
at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” App. 187, Indictment ¶10(d). In particular, the indictment alleges several conversations in which Trump pressured the Vice
President to reject States’ legitimate electoral votes or send them back
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to state legislatures for review.
Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their official responsibilities, they engage in official conduct. Presiding over the January 6 certification proceeding at
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