12/09/2026
๐๐ก๐ ๐ฆ๐ข๐ง๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฅ ๐ฌ๐๐ฅ๐๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐ก๐๐ญ๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ฌ๐จ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ฅ.
Almost all the opposition parties have proposed alternative benchmarks โ top earners, public-sector benchmarks, median income, MP allowances, too high, not high enough, etc.
But they all miss the First-principles question: Why this benchmark?
Among the opposition, The Workers' Party probably offers the strongest challenge to People's Action Party narrative, because it questions whether salary is actually the binding constraint in attracting political talent.
Harpreet Singh's counterfactual argument yesterday (11/9) was particularly spot on, using our judiciary as a compelling counter-example to challenge the assumption. He cites the judiciary drawing TOP lawyers despite pay below leading legal earnings.
Thus, if the PAP's theory is that lower salaries necessarily mean poorer political recruitment, PAP needs to elaborate and show the evidence.
What happened to recruitment after previous salary adjustments of -36%?
How many capable candidates were deterred? Release the numbers.
Where is the evidence that lower political pay leads to deteriorating governance?
๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฐ๐จ๐ซ๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ ๐จ๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ง๐๐.
I also particularly liked what Progress Singapore Party raised about the "political ecosystem." Competition matters. A stronger opposition, greater political diversity and genuine electoral competition can raise the standard of governance. Our vote-to-seat representation remains terribly disproportionate and we have a long way to go in terms of electoral reform.
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) position is principled, but personally I don't think it is sustainable. Push fixed remuneration too low and political participation could increasingly favour those already wealthy enough to absorb the opportunity cost. The opportunity cost is real so we have to take that into consideration.
But the common weakness across the Opposition argument is this:
They challenge the PAP's benchmark, but none FULLY challenge the PAP's underlying theory, except Hapreet offering of a strong evidence. All offer alternative benchmark without answering why that benchmark.
The PAP says:
๐๐ข๐ ๐ก๐๐ซ ๐ฌ๐๐ฅ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฌ โ ๐๐๐ญ๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐ญ๐๐ฅ๐๐ง๐ญ โ ๐๐๐ญ๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐ ๐จ๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ง๐๐.
And there is another issue: ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐๐ฐ๐จ๐ซ๐ค ๐ ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ข๐๐๐ซ๐๐๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
The PM determines a minister's grade, where the minister sits within the salary range, and the individual performance bonus, potentially up to six months' salary.
Yet there is limited transparency on how that individual performance assessment is actually determined.
Former top civil servant ๐๐ ๐ข๐๐ฆ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ ๐๐จ๐ฐ once raised precisely this type of concern, that when ministers are paid millions, the financial consequences of disagreeing with the PM become much greater. He likened it to the ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ฎ๐๐ก'๐ฌ ๐ฌ๐ฒ๐ง๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ๐. He later clarified that he could not know whether ministers under Lee Hsien Loong were actually afraid to speak up, because he had not attended those Cabinet meetings.
But what he raised remains legit.
If so much remuneration and career progression ultimately depends on one person's discretion, what is the probability that a minister will seriously challenge that person's decisions when something goes fundamentally wrong?
I feel the key should be about designing a system where ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐๐ค๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฐ๐๐ซ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐ญ๐๐๐ญ๐๐, ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ ๐จ๐ง ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐ ๐.
So what would a better framework look like?
I don't think we should replace one magic benchmark with another.
Instead, I would suggest an ๐ข๐ง๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐จ๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ข๐จ๐๐ข๐๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐ ๐๐ข๐ง๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ ๐ซ๐๐๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ:
๐. ๐๐๐ง๐ข๐จ๐ซ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ญ๐-๐ฌ๐๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ฑ๐๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ
What does Singapore pay people carrying comparable levels of responsibility and decision-making?
๐. ๐๐๐ง๐ข๐จ๐ซ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐-๐ฌ๐๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ก๐ข๐ฉ
What is the opportunity cost relative to senior civil service and other public-sector leadership roles?
๐. ๐๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐จ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ญ
What would capable candidates realistically give up โ financially and professionally โ to enter politics?
๐. ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ฅ๐ ๐ฃ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ข๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ
How does Singapore compare with other wealthy, high-income microstates and jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Luxembourg? Are we paying materially above or below comparable systems, and why?
๐. ๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐'๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
Where does political remuneration sit relative to Singaporean incomes โ not just the top 1,000 earners, but the broader income distribution?
The Commission should then moderate these five inputs, and publish its methodology, eg. A matrix and weightage of the above 5 points.
That gives us something much better than arguing whether what is the "right" number.
Because too high and too low are relative.
Then separate fixed pay from performance:
50% โ Fixed remuneration based on the above 5 reference points.
Compensate responsibility and professional opportunity cost.
20% โ National outcomes
Clearly defined and measurable national indicators. The national outcome component should reward measurable outcomes that the Government collectively influences โ such as real income growth, employment, productivity, fiscal sustainability and other clearly defined national indicators.
The key is that it should be based on outcomes, not activities. Ministers should not be rewarded simply because a policy was implemented; they should be rewarded when the policy produces measurable improvements for Singaporeans.
20% โ Long-term impact
The long-term impact component is essentially a terminal bonus, assessed every five years. Some of the most important decisions a Government makes cannot be fairly judged within one year, infrastructure, education, housing, demographics, productivity, healthcare capacity, fiscal sustainability and national resilience may take years to show their true consequences.
5% โ Ministry/individual performance
Pre-agreed, measurable objectives.
5% โ PM's discretion
Retain discretion for qualities that cannot be captured by KPIs but subject it to transparency and independent review.
And importantly, I would suggest a penalty mechanism.
If remuneration is genuinely performance-based, there must be meaningful downside for serious underperformance, not simply bonuses when things go well.
Take the Transport Minister
Assess reliability, capacity, safety, project delivery, cost efficiency and long-term infrastructure outcomes โ while accounting for factors outside the minister's control. Access the impact on long term as well.
The bigger point
I think almost all parties have missed a good opportunity.
Nobody asked:
Can we build a remuneration framework strong enough to become an institutional legacy for Singapore; one that can survive different Prime Ministers, different Governments and different generations?
That is what I would be aiming for.
Not "How much should ministers be paid?"
But:
Why should they be paid that amount?
How do we know it works?
Who determines performance?
Who checks the person making that determination?
What happens when performance is poor?
And how do we make sure the system remains relevant 10, 20 or 30 years from now?
Don't just offer another benchmark based on median income, or public sector or etc. Because it didn't answer why this benchmark?
A framework that built on ๐๐ข๐ซ๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐ข๐ง๐๐ข๐ฉ๐ฅ๐๐ฌ, ๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐๐ง๐๐, ๐ข๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ, ๐๐๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฅ๐จ๐ง๐ -๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฆ ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ญ; one that is strong enough to be passed on to the next generation.
That, to me, would be a far more meaningful legacy than simply deciding whether ministers should earning $1.4m, $2.8m or $3.6m.
What do you think? Comment below.
