20/04/2026
Whatever direction the situation may seem to be taking, reason suggests that Iran–US negotiations will eventually happen. Although the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, has issued a statement that they will not go to Pakistan for talks and that there will be no dialogue with the United States, the Americans are arriving—and they are not coming without some level of assurance.
The world of official statements is a strange one. On one hand, spokespersons solemnly declare that “there will be no talks,” while on the other, behind closed doors, chairs are being rearranged, tea is being kept warm, and interpreters are quietly practicing how to soften their words. Nations keep their flags raised high before their people, while inside, negotiation tables are being carefully prepared.
The situation remains as I have been saying: in Iran, on one side stand the Revolutionary Guards, firm in their hardline stance and ready to fight and sacrifice; on the other side are political representatives who seek dialogue and a lasting solution—one that benefits the nation, lifts economic sanctions, and settles matters once and for all.
This internal struggle is producing visible tension. The political leadership faces pressure from a religious establishment that favors a tougher approach. In the eyes of the Revolutionary Guards, there is a spark of resistance—they wish to write history with the edge of a sword. Meanwhile, the political figures hold a pen, knowing well that some lines are better written in ink than in blood. This is the fate of any state caught between ideology and necessity.
Negotiations—if not today, then tomorrow—will become inevitable, and by then it may already be too late. The political leadership understands this. War will cause losses on both sides. Even if the United States suffers, Iran’s losses will be many times greater, and recovering from them will be extremely difficult. Eventually, both sides will have to return to the negotiating table.
Neither can Iran eliminate a war machine like the United States, nor can the United States completely destroy Iran. In this chess game of power, there are many “checks,” but no “checkmate” in sight. At present, Iran holds a relatively strong position. It has leverage in geopolitical matters and still has room to secure what it wants. Tomorrow, after further damage, those options may shrink significantly.
For now, Arab countries remain largely silent. Much of the world appears to be quietly sympathetic toward Iran, while the United States and Israel seem relatively isolated. However, if the conflict reignites, many countries—including Arab states—may be compelled to take a clear side.
In the end, every war concludes either with surrender or through bilateral negotiations. Economic sanctions are a peculiar weapon: they do not make noise like bullets, but they slowly suffocate. Markets lose their vitality, currencies weaken, and questions begin to grow on the faces of ordinary people. In such circumstances, raising slogans of war is easy, but carrying a war to its logical conclusion is far more difficult.
History offers a simple lesson, though we tend to complicate it. Whether it was the Vietnam War or the Cold War, explosions eventually fall silent, and negotiation tables come alive again. Any other path is longer, bloodier, and far more expensive. When decisions are not made in time, consequences must be endured later.
The Iranian political leadership understands this reality. It is an intelligent nation. The United States also knows it cannot bring this war to a decisive end—it cannot eliminate Iran, nor force it into complete surrender. Given the constantly shifting dynamics of conflict, no final judgment can yet be made. It remains to be seen whether hardline forces in Iran prevail or whether political leadership fully takes control.
I still believe the Iranian delegation will come. Public statements are for domestic audiences; behind the scenes, matters remain in the hands of those who act with reason. It is entirely possible that talks will take place and still remain deadlocked—after all, disputes spanning half a century cannot be resolved in days. If they were, people themselves would become suspicious—and neither Iranian nor American leadership can afford such doubt among their citizens.
If, for some reason, the Iranian leadership truly does not come, then after the ceasefire period ends, the likelihood of war will be high—and war serves no one’s interest. Pakistan will cease its efforts, and whatever fate awaits the parties will be witnessed by the world, which will also bear its consequences.
As for those who wish to sabotage negotiations, who hope to see Pakistan’s peace efforts fail, or who are ready to place blame on Pakistan—they should remember:
“When the lamps go out, the wind belongs to no one.”
— Syed Mehdi Bukhari