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Rebuilding Fiji’s Unfinished Economy Completing the Productive Transformation to Escape the Low-Wage TrapFor nearly four...
13/06/2026

Rebuilding Fiji’s Unfinished Economy

Completing the Productive Transformation to Escape the Low-Wage Trap

For nearly four decades, Fiji has leaned on tourism, remittances, imports, and low-wage competitiveness while leaving its structural economic transformation incomplete. Rebuilding means finishing that transformation—strengthening productive industries that generate higher wages, resilient communities, and lasting national prosperity.

The Anatomy of Fiji’s Low-Wage Economy

Strong economies build depth across three interconnected layers:

1. The productive base (primary sector) — agriculture, fisheries, energy, forestry, mining, and raw materials.
2. The productive multiplier (secondary sector) — manufacturing, agro-processing, engineering, fabrication, logistics, and value addition.
3. The service economy (tertiary sector) — tourism, finance, technology, education, healthcare, and professional services.

The productive multiplier is the vital bridge between resources and prosperity. It transforms raw materials into higher-value products, creates skilled employment, deepens industrial capability, raises productivity, and supports higher wages.

Until 1987, Fiji was steadily expanding this foundation through sugar, hydropower, agriculture, engineering, public works, and technical industries—gradually building the industrial capability required for long-term economic transformation.

The 1987 coups disrupted far more than politics. They accelerated capital flight, skilled emigration, and investment collapse during the very period Fiji needed to deepen its industrial base. At the same time, preferential sugar access into Europe weakened, forcing Fiji to search for a new economic model.

To survive the post-1987 downturn, Fiji increasingly pivoted toward tourism, garments, remittances, import liberalisation, and low-wage competitiveness.

That strategy stabilised the economy in the short term.

Over time, however, it also produced premature deindustrialisation - agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed around 14–16% of GDP in the mid-1980s but account for only about 8% today.

Over the past four decades, Fiji has experienced substantial declines in rice, dairy, beef, copra, and sugar production, while dependence on imported rice, wheat, dairy products, edible oils, and processed foods has increased significantly.

Fiji gradually shifted from building productive depth to managing dependency, with large parts of the economy concentrated in lower-complexity activities such as retail, tourism services, import trading, labour export, and consumption-led growth.

Many businesses now operate within thin-margin environments heavily exposed to imported costs and weak domestic purchasing power. Under these conditions, firms struggle to invest in technology, productivity, workforce development, and long-term expansion.

Low productivity suppresses wages.
Low wages suppress demand.
Weak demand suppresses investment.
Shallow investment prevents productivity growth.
That is Fiji’s low-wage trap.

Its consequences extend far beyond wages. Low-productivity economies typically develop weak tax bases, rising household stress, growing urban congestion, increasing cost-of-living pressures, dependence on debt and remittances, and growing reliance on retirement savings withdrawals simply to sustain daily living.

PALM, RSE and the Irony of Labour Mobility

Labour mobility schemes unintentionally exposed this structural weakness.

For decades, Fiji’s economy relied heavily on relatively low domestic wages. The Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) and Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) schemes disrupted that captive structure.

Thousands of Fijians discovered that their productivity, discipline, and work ethic commanded far higher value abroad than at home.

The irony is profound.

Fiji now exports many of its best workers to help build the agricultural, logistics, manufacturing, and industrial systems of wealthier countries while struggling to build similar productive systems domestically.

Remittances now exceed FJD 1 billion annually and provide critical household support. Yet much of that income leaks back offshore through imported food, fuel, and consumer goods.

But why aren't our young people building the same productive systems here at home?
The answer is not a lack of ability or work ethic.

It is an economic structure that rewards low-complexity activity while underinvesting in the productive depth that creates higher wages, stronger industries, and long-term prosperity.

Changing that structure will require more than policy reform; it will require a new generation of builders, innovators, and entrepreneurs equipped with the skills to create value.

Breaking this cycle also requires a shift in mindset and an overhaul in technical and vocational education and training (TVET).

For generations, many of us have equated success with securing a job and climbing the corporate ladder. I held that belief myself until a personal wake-up call made me realise there is another equally rewarding path: entrepreneurship—identifying problems, creating solutions, building value, and owning the outcome.

Viewed this way, every job becomes an apprenticeship, providing the skills, networks, experience, and discipline needed to eventually build something of your own.

Yet this entrepreneurial mindset remains largely absent from our education system and economic culture. We teach children to become employees rather than creators of enterprises. When everyone waits to be hired, unemployment grows. When more people become entrepreneurs, they create the very jobs others seek.

In a country importing over FJD 1.1 billion worth of food each year, opportunities for youth-led agritech, food processing, engineering, logistics, manufacturing, and rural enterprises are not hypothetical—they are already waiting to be built.

Rebuilding the Productive Economy Through Landowner-Led Enterprise

Breaking Fiji’s low-wage economic trap requires rebuilding its productive base and completing the structural transformation that was left unfinished.

This is where Fiji still holds significant advantages.

The country possesses substantial agricultural land—much of it already cleared and usable—yet now lies abandoned, underutilised, or trapped in low-yield production systems.

Unlike many countries, iTaukei land ownership was preserved.

The challenge today is not ownership.
The challenge is productive utilisation.

Fiji also retains institutional foundations established during the 1970s and 1980s, when state-supported enterprises and development structures helped expand commercial agriculture beyond sugar and support broader rural production.

While the first major agricultural transformation after colonial rule was largely driven through the Girmitya-era farming system under ALTA-based access arrangements, the next transformation can increasingly be led by landowners themselves.

We must rebuild economic activity where people already live by activating land, supporting village enterprise, and creating commercially viable rural livelihoods.

This means mobilising Fiji’s 1,193 villages as productive economic units by linking land, labour, skills, finance, technology, and enterprise. Existing land frameworks should evolve so landowners participate directly—not merely as lessors, but as partners, entrepreneurs, and shareholders in farming, agro-processing, manufacturing, and rural industries.

Updating these frameworks to encourage enterprise partnerships and merit-based local leadership can reconnect authority with accountability and production with opportunity.

The objective is simple: turn idle land into productive enterprise, supported by finance, training, technology, and the skills already being developed through PALM and RSE experience overseas.

One example of what coordinated agricultural enterprise can achieve already exists in Fiji. Grace Road's integrated farming operations span approximately 400 hectares nationwide and employ around 150 people directly in farming, with total group employment reported in the hundreds.

Imagine what Fiji's 1,193 villages could achieve under the same principle of coordinated production, value addition, and commercial enterprise—leveraging their land, natural resources, and geographic advantages.
Where capable leadership and enterprise exist, land becomes wealth. Where they are absent, potential turns to paralysis, and opportunity gives way to exodus.

Financing the Transformation

Rebuilding Fiji’s productive economy will require smarter mobilisation of capital through blended finance involving development banks, commercial lenders, pension funds, private investors and strategic public investment.

Rather than relying solely on land as collateral, financing models should increasingly be based on viable enterprise plans, long-term supply agreements, cooperative ownership structures, and equity partnerships that allow landowners to participate directly in value creation.

The objective is to finance productive enterprise rather than speculative asset ownership.

Fiji’s existing institutions—including the Fiji Development Bank, commercial banks, and international development partners—already provide much of the architecture required. What is needed is a coordinated national investment framework aligned with long-term productive transformation.

Fiji's 1,193 villages can gradually evolve into modern enterprise economies producing strategic crops and value-added products at commercial scale under a coordinated national import-substitution strategy. Realising that potential requires consensus, long-term planning, and intergenerational enterprise master plans tailored to each area's land capability, climate, water resources, local skills, and comparative advantages. A coordinated national framework can then align production, financing, infrastructure, cold storage, transport, processing, marketing, and distribution—creating integrated value chains that transform dispersed village production into a nationally competitive productive economy.

The next productive revolution will not simply be powered by tractors and factories. It will also be powered by artificial intelligence, precision agriculture, robotics, drones, sensors, digital marketplaces, and advanced logistics. These technologies allow even small island economies to compete in ways that were unimaginable a generation ago. Fiji does not need to replicate twentieth-century industrialisation; it can leapfrog directly into a knowledge-driven productive economy where technology multiplies labour, data improves decisions, and innovation raises productivity across agriculture, manufacturing, and services alike.

Tourism as the Market, Not the Competitor

Rebuilding Fiji’s productive economy does not mean replacing tourism.

It means integrating tourism more deeply with domestic production.

Hotels, resorts, restaurants, cruise operators, and the wider hospitality sector represent one of Fiji’s largest captive markets. Every kilogram of imported fruit, vegetables or meat, every piece of imported furniture, every processed food item, beverage, textile, or manufactured product supplied to tourism represents an opportunity for domestic enterprise.

The stronger the linkages between tourism and local agriculture, manufacturing, agro-processing, logistics, and services, the greater the economic multiplier retained within Fiji instead of leaking offshore through imports.

Rather than competing with the productive economy, tourism can become one of its strongest engines.

Building Competitiveness, Not Permanent Protection

Strategic tariff shelters may help emerging industries achieve scale, learn, innovate, and improve productivity.

However, such protection should never become permanent.

Any support should be transparent, performance-based, and subject to predetermined time-limited clauses linked to productivity improvements, export readiness, and cost competitiveness.

The objective is not to create protected monopolies or permanently higher prices for consumers, but to nurture industries capable of competing successfully without assistance while strengthening national resilience and expanding consumer choice.

Ultimately, the goal is not economic isolation but strategic integration—participating in global markets from a position of productive strength rather than structural dependence.

Returning PALM and RSE workers—many now acquiring valuable agricultural, engineering, logistics, and operational experience overseas—could become one of the most important drivers of this productive reintegration.

Industrial Policy Is Back

Fiji would not be going backward.
The global economic model is changing.
Countries around the world are rebuilding industrial policy, supply-chain resilience, domestic manufacturing, food security, energy security, and strategic production capacity.
The era of assuming globalisation alone would solve structural vulnerability is ending.
Productive resilience is returning.
Fiji would simply be aligning itself with the direction the world is already taking.

Completing the Unfinished Economy

Fiji now requires a fundamental economic reset.
The country must reinvest in and modernise its productive base while rebuilding the productive multiplier so that a stronger service economy rests on real production rather than imported consumption.
The foundations already exist: land, labour, natural resources, geography, institutional memory, and entrepreneurial potential. What is missing is long-term alignment between land, capital, labour, technology, infrastructure, education, and national vision.
The proposals outlined here—mobilising Fiji's 1,193 villages into enterprise systems, leveraging returning PALM and RSE skills, integrating tourism with domestic production, deploying blended finance, embracing technology, and reducing dependence on imported food and fuel—are ambitious, but grounded in Fiji's existing capabilities and structural realities.
Forty years ago, Fiji stood on the threshold of becoming a deeper, more productive economy.
The tragedy is not that Fiji failed.
It is that Fiji stopped halfway through the transformation.
Yet the opportunity remains.
The land is still here.
The people are still here.
The skills are returning.
The technology exists.
What Fiji needs is the vision, policy coherence, and determination to finish what it started.
The goal is not merely to grow GDP, but to build an economy that creates productive jobs, retains wealth, develops capability, strengthens communities, and passes opportunity from one generation to the next.
Prosperity will not come from exporting labour and importing consumption.
It will come from creating value at home.
That is how nations escape the low-wage trap.
That is how productivity rises.
That is how industries deepen.
And that is how Fiji rebuilds its unfinished economy.

Author Bio

Sunil Chand (Fiji:2.0) is an engineer and reform strategist with over 30 years of senior leadership experience across manufacturing, regulation, and higher education, including strategic and operational roles at Fiji Industries Ltd/Pacific Cement (1994–2003), FCCC (2007–2009), and USP (2010–2019). He holds a BSc, MSc, MBA, and numerous additional professional qualifications. The views expressed herein are his and not those of this newspaper.

21/05/2026

Wrong Grid: How EFL Is Taking Fiji Down the Wrong Energy Path

EFL is taking Fiji down the wrong energy path — not because it has done nothing, but because after four decades of hydro development, billions in assets, repeated renewable targets, and major capex programmes, Fiji remains trapped in the imported-fuel vulnerability Monasavu was supposed to help Fiji escape.

Here is the evidence:

1. EFL’s 2023 Annual Report shows hydro generated 48.11% of electricity, thermal stations 45.10%, and IPPs 6.79%. Nearly half the grid remained thermal in 2023.

2. Monasavu was commissioned in 1983 specifically to reduce imported fuel dependence — yet diesel and HFO remain structurally necessary more than 40 years later.

3. When I served as Director Projects at FCCC (2007–2009), tariff increases were already being justified partly on the basis that Fiji would transition toward near-fully renewable electricity by around 2025. Today, EFL’s mission points toward 90% renewable energy by 2035 instead. The targets keep shifting while captive consumers keep paying.

4. EFL’s reports show continuing investment programmes, yet little evidence of transformational distributed-solar acceleration - < 5%.

5. EFL paid major dividends — about FJD 46.6M in 2022 and FJD 40.7M in 2023 — while fuel vulnerability persisted.

6. EFL’s 2023 report also recorded a loss after tax of about FJD 24.8M alongside fuel costs of roughly FJD 193M, exposing a contradiction between commercial returns and long-term energy security.

7. Rooftop solar remains constrained around the 5kW threshold for many connections — too small for many modern households once EV charging, induction cooking, batteries, and future electrification needs are considered.

8. The Audit (Exemption) Regulations 2021 exempt EFL from full Auditor-General scrutiny despite it being a strategic monopoly utility central to Fiji’s cost-of-living structure.

9. Pacific examples already prove distributed renewable transition is possible. Tokelau, Ta’u (American Samoa), the Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Niue have all pursued solar-plus-storage strategies to reduce diesel dependence and strengthen energy resilience — yet Fiji continues lagging despite having larger scale and stronger hydro foundations.

All this points to a deeper problem:

This is no longer simply a failure of ex*****on.

It is a failure of design.

More than 40 years after Monasavu:
• households remain constrained from meaningful self-generation,
• distributed solar pe*******on remains low,
• thermal exposure remains high,
• fuel surcharges keep returning,
• and captive consumers continue funding the consequences.

The conversation must now shift toward:
• independent technical review,
• transparent fuel-cost analysis,
• public generation-cost disclosure,
• accelerated distributed-energy reform,
• separation of regulatory powers from generation,
• and a national energy redesign strategy.

Fiji should seriously consider establishing an independent Energy Redesign Commission bringing together power-generation experts, engineers, regulators, economists, utilities, private-sector actors, and consumer representatives to rapidly redesign Fiji’s energy future around resilience, transparency, distributed renewables, and reduced fuel dependency — with the goal of achieving this transition within the shortest time possible.

The real issue is not this month’s fuel price.

The real issue is why Fiji’s electricity system still behaves like an oil-importing system instead of a renewable-energy nation.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0
Former FCCC Director Projects (2007–2009)

Does the Math Justify EFL’s 11 cents/kWh Increase?The debate over EFL’s proposed 11 cents/kWh surcharge should begin wit...
19/05/2026

Does the Math Justify EFL’s 11 cents/kWh Increase?

The debate over EFL’s proposed 11 cents/kWh surcharge should begin with one simple question:

Does the math support it?

EFL’s 2024 Annual Report shows that its total fuel cost was about FJD 211 million. Fiji also used roughly 1.1 billion kWh of electricity during the year.

Now apply the proposed increase:

11 cents × 1.1 billion kWh = about FJD 120 million.

That means consumers would collectively pay an additional FJD 120 million per year.

The next question is straightforward:

How much would EFL’s fuel costs need to rise to justify collecting an extra FJD 120 million?

The answer is:

About 57%.

Because:

FJD 120 million ÷ FJD 211 million ≈ 57%.

That is the key number in this debate.

Public reports suggested global fuel prices rose by roughly 20–40% for heavy fuel oil and 25–50% for diesel. But Fiji’s electricity system is not fully fuel-based.

According to EFL’s own figures:

* about 52% of generation comes from hydro,
* about 5% from renewables/IPPs,
* and only around 43% is thermal.

So Fiji is only partially exposed to global fuel-price shocks.

This means a 40% rise in fuel prices does not automatically translate into a 40% rise in overall electricity-generation costs — especially after considering:

* government fuel rebates,
* hydro generation,
* renewable offsets,
* hedging arrangements,
* and dispatch optimisation.

The current tariff also already contains a fuel-cost component. The proposed 11 cents is therefore an additional recovery on top of existing tariffs.

That is why the real issue is not whether fuel prices increased. They clearly did.

The real issue is whether EFL’s actual net recoverable fuel cost truly increased by something close to 57%.

Before approving any increase, FCCC should require EFL to publicly disclose:

* actual fuel purchased,
* actual prices paid,
* rebates received,
* hydro generation levels,
* additional thermal generation used,
* and the exact calculation used to arrive at 11 cents/kWh.

In a monopoly electricity system, captive consumers should not be asked to pay first and verify later.

Before approving a surcharge equivalent to a 57% fuel-cost increase, FCCC should require EFL to fully open its books.

Otherwise, consumers are not funding verified costs — they are funding someone’s greed.

- Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0
Former Director Projects, FCCC (2007–2009)

Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka says they would like to avoid power rationing in the country but if it cannot be avoided, then they will have to go wi

FSC’s Own Data Can Prove or Disprove the TCTS ClaimFiji’s sugar debate has become political.But the real question is sci...
13/05/2026

FSC’s Own Data Can Prove or Disprove the TCTS Claim

Fiji’s sugar debate has become political.
But the real question is scientific.

Is rising TCTS mainly caused by:
• mill inefficiency,
• poor cane quality,
• transport delays,
• declining cane supply,
• or all of the above interacting together?

For years, the industry has operated through blame:
growers vs mills,
mills vs growers,
politics vs politics.

But FSC’s own historical data can scientifically test the truth.

Using:
• mass-balance audits,
• mill-by-mill datasets,
• benchmarking,
• regression analysis,
• DEA efficiency models,
• and counterfactual simulations,

Fiji can finally separate:
• farm-side losses,
• logistics-side losses,
• and mill-side losses.

If mill inefficiency is the main cause — the data should prove it.

If the claim is exaggerated or incomplete — the data should expose that too.

Either way, Fiji wins.

Because industries recover through:
measurement,
engineering,
transparency,
accountability,
and evidence-based reform —

not slogans and blame games.

The sugar debate should move from politics…
to measurable truth.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0

Misleading Claims or Vote-Bank Politics? Keeping Sugar Alive While Farmers StruggleThe real misleading claim is not abou...
23/04/2026

Misleading Claims or Vote-Bank Politics? Keeping Sugar Alive While Farmers Struggle

The real misleading claim is not about whether the final cane price will be $85 or slightly above.

It is about keeping farmers trapped in sugar farming—even when the numbers say otherwise.

Debating top-ups, staged payments, and final price adjustments may clarify process.

But it does not change the economics.

The numbers have already spoken:
• Production costs ≈ FJD 800–1,000 per tonne vs world prices ≈ FJD 600–750
• Land under cane has halved (~70,000 ha → ~35,000 ha)
• Yields have fallen (~60 t/ha → ~40 t/ha)
• Cane quality has declined (TPol ~12% → ~10% or lower)

This is not a temporary issue of payment timing.
It is structural decline.

And the system is sustained by well-known structural causes:
• Loss of preferential pricing
• Expired and insecure land leases
• Rising input and labour costs
• Fragmented land limiting mechanisation
• Ageing mills and delayed modernisation
• Failed diversification into higher-value products
• Institutional instability and politicisation

An industry where costs exceed returns is not under pressure—it is already over.

Yet the message remains: keep planting.

Why?

Because the system is no longer about farmer outcomes.
It is about sustaining the appearance of an industry.

Top-ups, guarantees, and staged payments do not change the underlying equation.

Subsidy ↑ → activity appears ↑ → narrative sustained → reform delayed.

This system survives because failure is funded.

Keep farmers in cane → show activity → justify support → claim progress → repeat.

Meanwhile:
• Farmers remain cash-poor
• Debt cycles deepen
• Land stays locked in low-value use
• The next generation walks away

A full season of work should not end in survival.

Every hectare in cane today is a hectare not producing food, income, or energy.

This is the truth:

Sugar is no longer an economic engine.
It is a politically sustained narrative.

And that narrative comes at a cost.

Every season farmers are told to continue, they lose another year of income, another cycle of debt, and another chance to transition.

This is not just economic misalignment.
It is knowingly continuing a system that does not work—while shifting the debate to payment mechanics and political claims.

That is the real misleading claim.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0

National Federation Party leader and member of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Sugar, Professor Biman Prasad, says cane growers can expect a final price above the […]

Submission – Vuda Waste-to-Energy EIASubmission sent electronically to: doewest8@gmail.com; departmentofenvironmenteiaun...
21/04/2026

Submission – Vuda Waste-to-Energy EIA

Submission sent electronically to: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]

Bula,
Please find attached my submission on the proposed Vuda Waste-to-Energy project for consideration as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) review process.
The submission evaluates the project within a broader national energy, environmental, and economic context using a comparative framework, and provides recommendations aligned with long-term sustainability, public health, and energy security.
I respectfully request that this submission be considered by the Technical Review Committee as part of the assessment process.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute.
Vinaka vakalevu,
Sunil Chand (BSc., MSc, MBA)�Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0�M: 9222678�E: [email protected]
Date: 22 April 2026, 12:05 pm

————-
Submission on Proposed Vuda Waste-to-Energy Project
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Review
Submitted by:�Sunil Chand (BSc., MSc, MBA)�Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0�M: 9222678�E: [email protected]

Date: 22 April 2026, 12:05 pm

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* The proposed Waste-to-Energy (WtE) facility (~900,000 tonnes/year; ~80 MW) significantly exceeds Fiji’s waste generation (~190,000 tonnes/year), implying importation of 4–5× domestic waste.
* Under a 13-criteria evaluation framework, WtE scores ~49%, compared to Solar + Battery (~91%).
* The project introduces long-term environmental, health, financial, and sovereignty risks, including emissions, ash disposal, and contractual lock-in.
* The current EIA process appears to assess WtE in isolation, without a comparative alternatives analysis, which is required under EIA principles.
* Strong public concern has been expressed (207 submissions + 3,005-signature petition), particularly regarding location, health, and environmental risks.

Recommendation:
Defer approval until a full alternatives assessment is conducted and feedstock, environmental, and financial risks are independently verified.

1. PURPOSE OF SUBMISSION
This submission evaluates the Vuda WtE proposal across:
* Environmental
* Social
* Economic
* Strategic energy system impacts
It applies a 13-criteria comparative framework and aligns with the Environment Management Act (2005) and EIA requirements, particularly the obligation to assess feasible alternatives and cumulative impacts.

2. SCALE MISMATCH: WASTE GENERATION VS PLANT SIZE
2.1 Fiji Waste Reality
* Estimated national waste generation: ~190,000 tonnes/year
* Recycling rate:

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